'\" te
.\" Copyright (c) 2010, 2015, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
.TH ike.config 4 "22 Sep 2015" "SunOS 5.11" "File Formats"
.SH NAME
ike.config \- configuration file for IKE policy
.SH SYNOPSIS
.LP
.nf
\fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR
.fi

.SH DESCRIPTION
.sp
.LP
The \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR file contains rules for matching inbound IKE requests. It also contains rules for preparing outbound \fBIKE\fR requests.
.sp
.LP
You can test the syntactic correctness of a \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR file by using the \fB-c\fR or \fB-f\fR options of the \fBin.iked\fR(1M) command. You must use the \fB-c\fR option to test a \fBconfig\fR file. You can use the \fB-f\fR option if it is not in \fB/etc/inet/ike/config\fR.
.SS "Lexical Components"
.sp
.LP
On any line, an unquoted \fB#\fR character introduces a comment. The remainder of that line is ignored. Additionally, on any line, an unquoted \fB//\fR sequence introduces a comment. The remainder of that line is ignored.
.sp
.LP
The following types of lexical tokens are available in the \fBike.config\fR file:
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A decimal, hex, or octal number representation is as in C language.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fIIPaddr\fR/\fIprefix\fR/\fIrange\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An IPv4 or IPv6 address with an optional /\fINNN\fR suffix, (where \fINNN\fR is a \fInum\fR) that indicates an address (\fBCIDR\fR) prefix (for example, \fB10.1.2.0/24\fR). An optional /\fIADDR\fR suffix (where \fIADDR\fR is a second IP address) indicates an address/mask pair (for example, \fB10.1.2.0/255.255.255.0\fR). An optional -\fIADDR\fR suffix (where \fIADDR\fR is a second IPv4 address) indicates an inclusive range of addresses (for example, \fB10.1.2.0-10.1.2.255\fR). The \fB/\fR or \fB-\fR can be surrounded by an arbitrary amount of white space.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBXXX\fR | \fBYYY\fR | \fBZZZ\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Either the words \fBXXX\fR, \fBYYY\fR, or \fBZZZ\fR, for example, {yes, no}. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBp1-id-type\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An IKE phase 1 identity type. IKE phase 1 identity types include:
.br
.in +2
\fBdn, DN\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBdns, DNS\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBfqdn, FQDN\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBgn, GN\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBip, IP\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv4\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv4_prefix\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv4_range\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv6\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv6_prefix\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBipv6_range\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBmbox, MBOX\fR
.in -2
.br
.in +2
\fBuser_fqdn\fR
.in -2
Not all phase 1 identity types are supported.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fB"\fR\fIstring\fR\fB"\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A quoted string. 
.sp
Examples include:\fB"Label foo"\fR, or \fB"C=US, OU=Oracle\e\e, Inc., N=olemcd@eng.example.com"\fR
.sp
A backslash (\fB\e\fR) is an escape character. If the string needs an actual backslash, two must be specified.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A certificate selector, a \fIstring\fR which specifies the identities of zero or more certificates. The specifiers can conform to \fBX.509\fR naming conventions. 
.sp
A \fIcert-sel\fR can also use various shortcuts to match either subject alternative names, the filename or \fBslot\fR of a certificate in \fB/etc/inet/ike/publickeys\fR, or even the \fBISSUER\fR. For example:
.sp
.in +2
.nf
"SLOT=0" 
"EMAIL=postmaster@domain.org" 
"webmaster@domain.org" # Some just work w/o TYPE=
"IP=10.0.0.1"
"10.21.11.11"          # Some just work w/o TYPE=
"DNS=www.domain.org"
"mailhost.domain.org"  # Some just work w/o TYPE=
"ISSUER=C=US, O=Oracle\e\e, Inc., CN=Sun CA"
.fi
.in -2
.sp

Any \fIcert-sel\fR preceded by the character \fB!\fR indicates a negative match, that is, not matching this specifier. These are the same kind of strings used in \fBikecert\fR(1M).
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fIldap-list\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A quoted, comma-separated list of LDAP servers and ports. 
.sp
For example, \fB"ldap1.example.com"\fR, \fB"ldap1.example.com:389"\fR, \fB"ldap1.example.com:389,ldap2.example.com"\fR. 
.sp
The default port for LDAP is \fB389\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fIparameter-list\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A list of parameters.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fIlabel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A sensitivity label, either as a quoted string containing a human-readable label or as a hexadecimal format internal text label. See \fBlabels\fR(5) for more information. 
.sp
For example, \fBPUBLIC, 0x0002-08-08\fR.
.RE

.SS "File Body Entries"
.sp
.LP
There are four main types of entries: 
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
global parameters
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
IKE phase 1 transform defaults
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
IKE rule defaults
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
IKE rules
.RE
.sp
.LP
The global parameter entries are as follows:
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBcert_root \fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The X.509 distinguished name of a certificate that is a trusted root CA certificate.It must be encoded in a file in the \fB/etc/inet/ike/publickeys\fR directory. It must have a CRL in \fB/etc/inet/ike/crl\fRs. Multiple \fBcert_root\fR parameters aggregate. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBcert_trust\fR \fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Specifies an X.509 distinguished name of a certificate that is self-signed, or has otherwise been verified as trustworthy for signing IKE exchanges. It must be encoded in a file in \fB/etc/inet/ike/publickeys\fR. Multiple \fBcert_trust\fR parameters aggregate.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBexpire_timer\fR \fIinteger\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The number of seconds to let a not-yet-complete IKE Phase I (Main Mode) negotiation linger before deleting it. Default value: 300 seconds.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBignore_crls\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If this keyword is present in the file, \fBin.iked\fR(1M) ignores Certificate Revocation Lists (\fBCRL\fRs) for root \fBCA\fRs (as given in \fBcert_root\fR)
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBignore_ocsp\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If this keyword is present in the file, \fBin.iked\fR ignores OCSP information in certificate X.509v3 extensions and does not query Certificate Authorities via OCSP.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBlabel_aware\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
This keyword can only be used on systems where Trusted Extensions are enabled. If this keyword is present in the file, \fBin.iked\fR(1M) attaches sensitivity label extensions to security associations, consults the \fBtnrhdb\fR for information about the clearances of peers, and negotiates labels with label-aware peers. Several additional keywords modify the behavior of \fBin.iked\fR in label-aware mode.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBldap_server\fR \fIldap-list\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A list of LDAP servers to query for certificates. The list can be additive.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBpkcs11_path\fR \fIstring\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The string that follows is a name of a shared object (\fB\&.so\fR) that implements the PKCS#11 standard. The name is passed directly into \fBdlopen\fR(3C) for linking, with all of the semantics of that library call. By default, \fBin.iked\fR(1M) runs the same ISA as the running kernel, so a library specified using \fBpkcs11_path\fR and an absolute pathname \fBmust\fR match the same ISA as the kernel. One can use the start/exec SMF property (see \fBsvccfg\fR(1M)) to change \fBin.iked\fR's ISA, but it is not recommended.
.sp
If this setting is not present, the default value is set to \fBlibpkcs11.so\fR. Most cryptographic providers go through the default library, and this parameter should only be used if a specialized provider of IKE-useful cryptographic services cannot interface with the Solaris Cryptographic Framework. For more information, see the \fBcryptoadm\fR(1M) man page.
.sp
This option is now deprecated, and might be removed in a future release.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBproxy\fR \fIstring\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The string following this keyword must be a URL for an HTTP proxy, for example, \fBhttp://proxy:8080\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp2_rekey_initiator_only\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If this keyword is present in the file, \fBin.iked\fR only responds to, and rekeys phase 2 SAs which it creates. This option may be useful for interoperability with peer implementations that follow such a rekeying scheme.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBretry_limit\fR \fIinteger\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The number of retransmits before any IKE negotiation or Dead Peer Detection (DPD) process is aborted. Default value: 5 times.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBretry_timer_init\fR \fIinteger\fR or \fIfloat\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The initial interval (in seconds) between retransmits. This interval is doubled until the \fBretry_timer_max\fR value (see below) is reached. Default value: 0.5 seconds.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBretry_timer_max\fR \fIinteger\fR or \fIfloat\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The maximum interval (in seconds) between retransmits. Used for both IKE and Dead Peer Detection (DPD). The doubling retransmit interval stops growing at this limit. Default value: 30 seconds.
.sp
This value is never reached with the default configuration. The longest interval is 8 (0.5 * 2 ^ (5 - 1)) seconds.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBsocks\fR \fIstring\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The string following this keyword must be a URL for a SOCKS proxy, for example, \fBsocks://socks-proxy\fR.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBuse_http\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If this keyword is present in the file, \fBin.iked\fR(1M) uses HTTP to retrieve Certificate Revocation Lists (\fBCRL\fRs).
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBwire_label inner\fR \fBwire_label label\fR \fBwire_label none label\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
This keyword can only be used if \fBlabel_aware\fR mode is selected and defines how IKE communicates with label-aware peers. \fBwire_label inner\fR reuses the inner label, and sends key management traffic as \fBadmin_low\fR. \fBwire_label label\fR uses the specified label for key management traffic and uses that label as the outer label for all encrypted traffic. The label is attached to each packet as a \fBCIPSO\fR label. \fBwire_label none label\fR does not attach a \fBCIPSO\fR label to either key management traffic or traffic sent as a given \fBSA\fR, but otherwise treats the traffic as if it had the given label.
.RE

.sp
.LP
The following IKE phase 1 transform parameters can be prefigured using file-level defaults. Values specified within any given transform override these defaults.
.sp
.LP
The IKE phase 1 transform defaults are as follows:
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp1_lifetime_secs\fR \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The proposed default lifetime, in seconds, of an IKE phase 1 security association (\fBSA\fR). 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp1_nonce_len\fR \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The length in bytes of the phase 1 (main mode) nonce data. This cannot be specified on a per-rule basis. 
.RE

.sp
.LP
The following IKE rule parameters can be preconfigured using file-level defaults. Values specified within any given rule override these defaults, unless a rule cannot.
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp2_lifetime_secs\fR \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The proposed default lifetime, in seconds, of an IKE phase 2 security association (SA). This value is optional. If omitted, a default value is used.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp2_softlife_secs\fR \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The soft lifetime of a phase 2 SA, in seconds. If this value is specified, the SA soft expires after the number of seconds specified by \fBp2_softlife_secs\fR. This causes \fBin.iked\fR to renegotiate a new phase 2 SA before the original SA expires.
.sp
This value is optional, if omitted, soft expiry occurs after 90% of the lifetime specified by \fBp2_lifetime_secs\fR. The value specified by \fBp2_softlife_secs\fR is ignored if \fBp2_lifetime_secs\fR is not specified.
.sp
Setting \fBp2_softlife_secs\fR to the same value as \fBp2_lifetime_secs\fR disables soft expires.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp2_idletime_secs\fR \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The idle lifetime of a phase 2 SA, in seconds. If the value is specified, the value specifies the lifetime of the SA, if the security association is not used before the SA is revalidated.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp2_lifetime_kb\fR \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The lifetime of an SA can optionally be specified in kilobytes. This parameter specifies the default value. If lifetimes are specified in both seconds and kilobytes, the SA expires when either the seconds or kilobyte thresholds are passed. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp2_softlife_kb\fR \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
This value is the number of kilobytes that can be protected by an SA before a soft expire occurs (see \fBp2_softlife_secs\fR, above).
.sp
This value is optional. If omitted, soft expiry occurs after 90% of the lifetime specified by \fBp2_lifetime_kb\fR. The value specified by \fBp2_softlife_kb\fR is ignored if \fBp2_lifetime_kb\fR is not specified.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp2_nonce_len\fR \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The length in bytes of the phase 2 (quick mode) nonce data. This cannot be specified on a per-rule basis. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBlocal_id_type\fR \fIp1-id-type\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The local identity for IKE requires a type. This identity type is reflected in the IKE exchange. It is needed because a single certificate can contain multiple values for use in IKE phase 1. The type can be one of the following values:
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
an IP address (for example, \fB10.1.1.2\fR)
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
DNS name, also known as \fBFQDN\fR (for example, \fBtest.domain.com\fR)
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
\fBMBOX\fR, also known as \fBUSER_FQDN\fR or RFC 822 name (for example, \fBroot@domain.com\fR)
.RE
.RS +4
.TP
.ie t \(bu
.el o
\fBDN-A X.509\fR distinguished name (for example, \fBC=US, O=Oracle\e, Inc., CN=Sun Test cert\fR)
.RE
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fBp1_xform\fR '{' \fIparameter-list\fR '}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A phase 1 transform specifies a method for protecting an IKE phase 1 exchange. An initiator offers up lists of phase 1 transforms, and a receiver is expected to only accept such an entry if it matches one in a phase 1 rule. There can be several of these, and they are additive. There must be either at least one phase 1 transform in a rule or a global default phase 1 transform list. In a configuration file without a global default phase 1 transform list \fBand\fR a rule without a phase, transform list is an invalid file. Unless specified as optional, elements in the parameter-list must occur exactly once within a given transform's parameter-list: 
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBoakley_group \fInumber\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The Oakley Diffie-Hellman group used for IKE SA key derivation. The group numbers are defined in RFC 2409, Appendix A, RFC 3526, RFC 4753, and RFC 5114. Acceptable values are currently:
.br
.in +2
1 (768-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
2 (1024-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
5 (1536-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
14 (2048-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
15 (3072-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
16 (4096-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
19 (256-bit ECP defined by RFC4753)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
20 (384-bit ECP defined by RFC4753)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
21 (521-bit ECP defined by RFC4753)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
22 (1024-bit MODP defined by RFC5114)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
23 (2048-bit MODP defined by RFC5114)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
24 (2048-bit MODP defined by RFC5114)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
25 (192-bit ECP defined by RFC5114)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
26 (224-bit ECP defined by RFC5114)
.in -2
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBencr_alg {aes, aes-cbc, 3des, 3des-cbc, blowfish, blowfish-cbc, des, des-cbc}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An encryption algorithm.
.sp
The algorithm names without mode specification are all synonyms for the CBC modes, for example, \fBaes-cbc\fR and \fBaes\fR are the same.
.sp
Only \fBaes/aes-cbc\fR allows optional key-size setting, using the (\fBlow..high\fR) syntax, the same as specified in \fBipsecconf\fR(1M) for the \fBkeylen\fR specifier. To specify a single AES key size, the low value must equal the high value.
.sp
If no range is specified, all three AES key sizes are allowed.
.sp
Note that all the above algorithms beside AES are considered deprecated and are supported for backward compatibility purposes. Administrators should migrate to using AES as soon as feasible.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBauth_alg {sha256, sha384, sha512, sha1, sha, md5}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An authentication algorithm.
.sp
Note that \fBmd5\fR and \fBsha/sha1\fR are considered deprecated and are supported for backward compatibility purposes. Administrators should migrate to the stronger algorithms as soon as feasible.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBauth_method {preshared, rsa_sig, rsa_encrypt, dss_sig}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The authentication method used for IKE phase 1. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBp1_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Optional. The lifetime for a phase 1 SA. 
.RE

.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBp2_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If configuring the kernel defaults is not sufficient for different tasks, this parameter can be used on a per-rule basis to set the IPsec \fBSA\fR lifetimes in seconds. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBp2_pfs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Use perfect forward secrecy for phase 2 (quick mode). If selected, the oakley group specified is used for phase 2 PFS. Acceptable values are the same as for the \fBoakley_group\fR parameter listed above.
.RE

.sp
.LP
An IKE rule starts with a right-curly-brace (\fB{\fR), ends with a left-curly-brace (\fB}\fR), and has the following parameters in between:
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBlabel \fIstring\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Required parameter. The administrative interface to \fBin.iked\fR looks up phase 1 policy rules with the label as the search string. The administrative interface also converts the label into an index, suitable for an extended ACQUIRE message from PF_KEY - effectively tying IPsec policy to IKE policy in the case of a node initiating traffic. Only one \fBlabel\fR parameter is allowed per rule. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBlocal_addr <\fIIPaddr\fR/\fIprefix\fR/\fIrange\fR>\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Required parameter. The local address, address prefix, or address range for this phase 1 rule. Multiple \fBlocal_addr\fR parameters accumulate within a given rule.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBremote_addr <\fIIPaddr\fR/\fIprefix\fR/\fIrang\fRe>\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Required parameter. The remote address, address prefix, or address range for this phase 1 rule. Multiple \fBremote_addr\fR parameters accumulate within a given rule. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBlocal_id_type \fIp1-id-type\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Which phase 1 identity type to use for this rule. The supported p1-id-types are described in section for the global parameter \fBlocal_id_type\fR. Within a given rule, all phase 1 transforms must either use preshared or non-preshared authentication (they can not be mixed). 
.sp
For rules with preshared authentication, the \fBlocal_id_type\fR parameter is optional, and defaults to IP. For rules which use non-preshared authentication, the \fBlocal_id_type\fR preshared authentication, the \fBlocal_id_type\fR parameter parameter is required. Multiple \fBlocal_id_type\fR parameters within a rule are not allowed.
.sp
For rules with preshared authentication, the \fBlocal_id_type\fR parameter is optional, and defaults to \fBIP\fR. For rules which use non-preshared authentication, the \fBlocal_id_type\fR parameter is required. Multiple \fBlocal_id_type\fR parameters within a rule are not allowed.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBlocal_id \fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Disallowed for preshared authentication method; required parameter for non-preshared authentication method. The local identity string or certificate selector. Only one local identity per rule is used, the first one stated.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBremote_id \fIcert-sel\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Disallowed for preshared authentication method; required parameter for non-preshared authentication method. Selector for which remote phase 1 identities are allowed by this rule. Multiple \fBremote_id\fR parameters accumulate within a given rule. If a single empty string (\fB""\fR) is given, then this accepts any remote \fBID\fR for phase 1. It is recommended that certificate trust chains or address enforcement be configured strictly to prevent a breakdown in security if this value for \fBremote_id\fR is used. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBp2_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
If configuring the kernel defaults is not sufficient for different tasks, this parameter can be used on a per-rule basis to set the IPsec \fBSA\fR lifetimes in seconds. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBp2_pfs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Use perfect forward secrecy for phase 2 (quick mode). If selected, the oakley group specified is used for phase 2 PFS. Acceptable values are:
.br
.in +2
0 (do not use Perfect Forward Secrecy for IPsec SAs)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
1 (768-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
2 (1024-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
5 (1536-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
14 (2048-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
15 (3072-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
16 (4096-bit)
.in -2
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBp1_xform \fB{\fR \fIparameter-list\fR \fB}\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
A phase 1 transform specifies a method for protecting an IKE phase 1 exchange. An initiator offers up lists of phase 1 transforms, and a receiver is expected to only accept such an entry if it matches one in a phase 1 rule. There can be several of these, and they are additive. There must be either at least one phase 1 transform in a rule or a global default phase 1 transform list. A \fBike.config\fR file without a global default phase 1transform list \fBand\fR a rule without a phase 1 transform list is an invalid file. Elements within the parameter-list; unless specified as optional, must occur exactly once within a given transform's parameter-list: 
.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBoakley_group \fInumber\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The Oakley Diffie-Hellman group used for \fBIKE SA\fR key derivation. Acceptable values are currently:
.br
.in +2
1 (768-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
2 (1024-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
5 (1536-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
14 (2048-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
15 (3072-bit)
.in -2
.br
.in +2
16 (4096-bit)
.in -2
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBencr_alg {aes, aes-cbc, 3des, 3des-cbc, blowfish, blowfish-cbc, des, des-cbc}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An encryption algorithm, as in \fBipsecconf\fR(1M). However, of the ciphers listed above, only \fBaes\fR and \fBaes-cbc\fR allow optional key-size setting, using the "low value-to-high value" syntax. To specify a single AES key size, the low value must equal the high value. If no range is specified, all three AES key sizes are allowed.
.sp
Note that all the above algorithms beside AES are considered deprecated and are supported for backwards compatibility purposes. Administrators should migrate to using AES as soon as feasible.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBauth_alg {sha256, sha384, sha512, sha1, sha, md5}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
An authentication algorithm, as specified in \fBipseckey\fR(1M).
.sp
Note that \fBmd5\fR and \fBsha/sha1\fR are considered deprecated and are supported for backwards compatibility purposes. Administrators should migrate to the stronger algorithms as soon as feasible.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBauth_method {preshared, rsa_sig, rsa_encrypt, dss_sig}\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
The authentication method used for IKE phase 1. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fB\fR
.ad
.br
.na
\fBmulti_label\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Optional. Useful only on systems with Trusted Extensions enabled. Override \fBtnrhdb\fR and assume peer is label-aware.
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBp1_lifetime_secs \fInum\fR\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Optional. The lifetime for a phase 1 SA. 
.RE

.sp
.ne 2
.mk
.na
\fBsingle_label\fR
.ad
.sp .6
.RS 4n
Optional. Useful only on systems with Trusted Extensions enabled. Override \fBtnrhdb\fR and assume peer is not label-aware.
.RE

.RE

.SH EXAMPLES
.LP
\fBExample 1 \fRA Sample \fBike.config\fR File
.sp
.LP
The following is an example of an \fBike.config\fR file: 

.sp
.in +2
.nf
 
### BEGINNING OF FILE

### First some global parameters...

### certificate parameters...

# Root certificates. I SHOULD use a full Distinguished Name.
# I must have this certificate in my local filesystem, see ikecert(1m).
cert_root   "C=US, O=Oracle\e\e, Inc., CN=Sun CA"

# Explicitly trusted certs that need no signatures, or perhaps 
# self-signed ones. Like root certificates, use full DNs for them 
# for now.
cert_trust   "EMAIL=root@domain.org"

# Where do I send LDAP requests?
ldap_server        "ldap1.domain.org,ldap2.domain.org:389"

## phase 1 transform defaults...

p1_lifetime_secs 14400
p1_nonce_len 20

## Parameters that might also show up in rules.

p1_xform { auth_method preshared oakley_group 14 auth_alg sha256
          encr_alg aes }
p2_pfs 2



### Now some rules...

{
   label "simple inheritor"
   local_id_type ip
   local_addr 10.1.1.1
   remote_addr 10.1.1.2
}
{
   label "simple inheritor IPv6"
   local_id_type ipv6
   local_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6
   remote_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fefb:3780
}

{
   # an index-only rule.  If I'm a receiver, and all I 
   # have are index-only rules, what do I do about inbound IKE requests?
   # Answer:  Take them all!

   label "default rule"
   # Use whatever "host" (e.g. IP address) identity is appropriate
   local_id_type ipv4

   local_addr 0.0.0.0/0
   remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0

   p2_pfs 5

   # Now I'm going to have the p1_xforms
   p1_xform
   {auth_method preshared  oakley_group 24  auth_alg sha512  encr_alg \e
   aes(192..256) }   p1_xform
   {auth_method preshared  oakley_group 14  auth_alg sha256  encr_alg aes }
   
   # After said list, another keyword (or a '}') stops xform 
   # parsing.
}

{
   # Let's try something a little more conventional.

   label "host to .80 subnet"
   local_id_type ip
   local_id "10.1.86.51"

   remote_id ""    # Take any, use remote_addr for access control.

   local_addr 10.1.86.51
   remote_addr 10.1.80.0/24

   p1_xform 
   { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 16  auth_alg sha512 encr_alg aes }
   p1_xform
   { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 14  auth_alg sha256 encr_alg \e
     aes }
   p1_xform 
   { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 14  auth_alg sha256 encr_alg 3des }
   p1_xform
   { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 14  auth_alg sha1  encr_alg \e
     blowfish }
}

{
   # Let's try something a little more conventional, but with ipv6.

    label "host to fe80::/10 subnet"
    local_id_type ip
    local_id "fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6"

    remote_id ""    # Take any, use remote_addr for access control.

    local_addr fe80::a00:20ff:fe7d:6
    remote_addr fe80::/10

    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 16  auth_alg sha512 encr_alg aes }
    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 14  auth_alg sha256 encr_alg \e
      aes }
    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 14  auth_alg sha256  encr_alg \e
      3des }
    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig  oakley_group 14  auth_alg sha1  encr_alg \e
      blowfish }
}
     
{
    # How about something with a different cert type and name?

    label "punchin-point"
    local_id_type mbox
    local_id "ipsec-wizard@domain.org"

    remote_id "10.5.5.128"

    local_addr 0.0.0.0/0
    remote_addr 10.5.5.128

    p1_xform
    { auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 14 auth_alg sha256 encr_alg \e
      aes }
}

{
   label "receiver side"

   remote_id "ipsec-wizard@domain.org"

   local_id_type ip
   local_id "10.5.5.128"

   local_addr 10.5.5.128
   remote_addr 0.0.0.0/0

   p1_xform
   { auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 14 auth_alg sha256 encr_alg aes }
   # NOTE:  Specifying preshared null-and-voids the remote_id/local_id
   #        fields.
   p1_xform
   { auth_method preshared oakley_group 14 auth_alg sha256 encr_alg \e
     aes}
   
}

{
   # Only allow AES with 256-bit keys in Phase 1

   label "keylen-restricted"

   local_id_type ip
   local_id "10.1.1.3"
   local_addr 10.1.1.3
   remote_addr 10.1.1.4

   p1_xform
   {auth_method rsa_sig oakley_group 14 auth_alg sha512 encr_alg \e
   aes(256)}
}
.fi
.in -2

.SH ATTRIBUTES
.sp
.LP
See \fBattributes\fR(5) for descriptions of the following attributes:
.sp

.sp
.TS
tab() box;
cw(2.75i) |cw(2.75i) 
lw(2.75i) |lw(2.75i) 
.
ATTRIBUTE TYPEATTRIBUTE VALUE
_
Availabilitysystem/core-os
_
Interface StabilityCommitted
.TE

.SH SEE ALSO
.sp
.LP
\fBcryptoadm\fR(1M), \fBikeadm\fR(1M), \fBin.iked\fR(1M), \fBikecert\fR(1M), \fBipseckey\fR(1M), \fBipsecalgs\fR(1M), \fBipsecconf\fR(1M), \fBsvccfg\fR(1M), \fBdlopen\fR(3C), \fBattributes\fR(5), \fBlabels\fR(5), \fBrandom\fR(7D)
.sp
.LP
Harkins, Dan and Carrel, Dave. \fIRFC 2409, Internet Key Exchange (IKE)\fR. Cisco Systems, November 1998.
.sp
.LP
Maughan, Douglas et. al. \fIRFC 2408, Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)\fR. National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD. November 1998.
.sp
.LP
Piper, Derrell. \fIRFC 2407, The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP\fR. Network Alchemy. Santa Cruz, California. November 1998.
.sp
.LP
Kivinen, T. \fIRFC 3526, More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman Groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)\fR. The Internet Society, Network Working Group. May 2003.